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In the afteIT11athof the 1988 presidential election, the PRD (Partido de la Revolución
Democrática) was founded with great optimismo The vote percentages obtained by the
PRD, however, fell well below the vote percentage Cárdenas was officially credited
with in 1988. Of twenty-two statewide races the PRD participated in between July
1989 and March 1991, the PRD obtained only 10 percent of the vote. In the 1988
presidential elections in these same states, the FDN (Frente Democrática Nacional)
obtained 24.8 percent of the vote.! Similarly, in the 1991 congressional elections the
PRD obtained a lackluster 8.27 percent of the vote, compared to 31.12 percent in
1988.2 This paper will attempt to analyze the decline in the PRD vote compared to the
1988 FDN vote.
One of the principal causes of the decline in the PRD vote could be labeled "fraud
fatigue." Without exception the PRD has been declared the loser in the elections that
the PRD (and before it the FDN) felt it had the best chance to win. The PRD has
blamed the losses on election fraud. These elections include the July 1988 presidential
election, the November 1988 gubernatorial election in Tabasco, the July 1989 election
in Michoacán, the December 1989 elections in Michoacán and Guerrero, and the
November 1990 election in the State of Mexico. The 1991 congressional elections and
the 1992 election in Michoacán praduced additional fraud charges.
Inevitably, the confrontation of what it regards as an unending string of frauds has
changed the nature of the party. As columnist José Woldenberg commented, "The
government's unscrupulous fraudulent manipulation of election returns has pushed the
PRD leadership to the left and at the same time isolated it."3 It has also provided an
easy excuse for failure. PRD member Jorge Alcocer claimed charges of "fraud" are
often used to cover the failings of the PRD.4 Finally the PRD's preoccupation with
fraud has diverted energy fram other organizational tasks. As Cárdenas noted, "The
government's offensive has forced us to devote more attention to conflicts which result
from electoral dishonesty, fraud, and imposition."5
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Another factor affecting the PRD has been violent attacks on its members. During
1989 and 1990, 73 PRD members were killed, of whom 17 were in Oaxaca, 16 in
Michoacán, and 13 in Puebla.6 Luis Salazar C. commented on the attacks directed at
PRD members: "No one can deny or even minimize the harassment and aggression
that this new organization has suffered at the hands of various branches of
government. Dozens of dead, arrested, kidnapped, and threatened speak clearly of the
hostility with which they have viewed the forrnation of the PRD."7
The political environment in which the PRD finds itself has proved less favorable
than the one the FDN faced. In 1988 Mexico was mired in a deep recession, and blame
was placed on the incumbents. Several factors have changed. Economic growth
resumed, and Salinas promoted the widely approved free trade agreement. AIso the
poli tic al reform and primary elections have improved the PRI's image. All of these
have cut into the protest vote.
PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) Deputy Carlos Castillo Pérez cornrnented
on the changing poli tic al environment in a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on
October 18, 1989. He addressed the PRD deputies: "You members of the PRD
assumed that the men of the official party and of the government would not change.
We assumed that they are indeed capable of change. You believe that reforrn will not
occur within the executive branch and we feel it is worth attempting to reforrn the
executive branch."8 The Solidarity program has been especially important, since it has
tended to undermine the PRD's base among the poor. As Octavio Rodríguez Araujo
noted, "In a country with great needs and inequality, heavy spending should not be
rninirnized even though it insults recipients' dignity and is quite insufficient."9
One of the issues that most caught voters' imaginations in 1988 was suspending
debt payments. I-Iowever, the PRI effectively co-opted that issue after the debt
renegotiation; its stated position now resembles the PRD position. In the Plan of
Action approved after the September 1990 Assembly of the PRI, the official party
declared that it proposed "struggling for the full utilization and optimal use of
resources freed by foreign debt renegotiation, using them for economic growth and
social development in keeping with the nation's ability to pay, and giving special
priority to rural areas in reallocating resources."lO
Also, the potential cost of casting a protest vote has risen. In 1988 there was liule to
lose by voting for, or even electing, a candidate whom the world's financiers might
deem too radical. At the time, new credits and new investment had stopped, the
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economy was stagnant, and massive debt payments were flowing out of the country.
By 1990 the Mexican economy was growing at a modest rate, and the massive flow of
new investment more than offset debt payments. Thus, voters had something to lose
by a rejection of the PRI. The recent examples of Nicaragua and Chile confirm that
nations can paya high economic price for electing leaders not to the liking of the
United States and the international financial community.
Another factor limiting the PRD has been its reliance on the Mexican Revolution of
1910-17 for its ideological inspiration. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas is closely associated
with the Revolution since he literally grew up at the feet of the man most close1y
identified with its achievements, Lázaro Cárdenas. For the younger Cárdenas, despite
the great changes in Mexico and the world, the Mexican Revolution still provides
guidance. He sees the unmet goal s of the Revolution as (1) democracy, (2) eliminating
poverty, and (3) an equitable intemational order.ll Cárdenas reaffirmed the importance
of the Revolution when visiting Washington state in 1989: "The PRD is the heir of
those who engaged in the armed struggle of 1910, seeking to end inequality and
poverty, and above all, seeking democracy."12
Commentators have noted the limited effectiveness of the PRD's appeal to the ideals
of the Mexican Revolution. The main appeal of such a message is to marginallaborers
and peasants.13 AIso, the image of the Mexican Revolution, given the crisis of the
1980s, is undergoing rapid change in Mexico, just as the image of the Bolshevik
Revolution in the former Soviet Union has undergone change. Columnist Moisés
Lawson Villafaña commented on the PRD, "A party can no longer flourish in today' s
Mexico as the standard bearer of an economic model, the historical model of the
Revolution, which has proved inefficient and terribly unjust."14 Finally, the Mexican
Revolution's appeal to younger Mexicans is weak. As Rodolfo González Guevara
noted, "The Mexican Revolution does not mean anything to Mexico's youth nor does
it interest them."15
Another problem faced by the PRD is its being repeatedly described as part of the
"Left." In a sense such a charge is unfair. Cárdenas himself rejects the label, preferring
the term "inheritor of the Mexican Revolution. "16 Nonetheless, the PRD is widely
perceived as part of the Left and the image is continually reinforced by media
references to it as "left" or "center-left." To the extent the Left label has stuck, it has
hurt. As Jorge Castañeda noted, the Left suffers from guilt by association with Cuba
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and the former USSR. He also noted that in current economic thinking the Left is
associated with failure.17
To the extent that the PRD is attempting to benefit by representing the Left, it faces
difficulties. As French political theorist Régis Debray noted, "Today no valid
alternative to the dynamism of the world market has been developed."18 The Mexican
Left has limited appeal. The PSUM (Partido Socialista Unificado de México),
forerunner of the PMS (Partodo Mexicano Socialista), received only 0.6 percent of the
vote in Michoacán in 1986.19 A polI found only 11 percent of Mexicans considered
themselves to be on the left, while 33 percent said they were in the center, and 56
percent on the right. 20
The PRD has also suffered due to the changed perception of state ownership of
corporations. In general Mexicans share the worldwide acceptance of privatization as a
remedy to economic ilIs. In fact, having viewed the poor performance of many state-
owned corporations, Mexicans are often among the most eager to reduce the economic
role of the state. As a commentator noted, "Frankly, Salinas could have asked J. P.
Morgan himself to buy Telmex, and the man-on-the street would have said, 'Why not?
Can't be no worse."'21
Marcela Toledano, speaking for the FDN on the day Salinas was inaugurated, set
the tone for Cárdenas's movement in terms of privatization. She stated, "It is
necessary to stop the process of privatization of state firms."22 The PRD later adopted
this position: "The leading economic role of the state should be strengthened. National
democratic planning should provide society with the opportunity to participate in
planning, thus democraticalIy defining strategic priorities for development. The State
should be the ultimate owner of natural resources."23
Cárdenas has criticized the sale of the widely disliked phone company, the banking
system, and sugarmilIs, al! of which were government owned at the start of the Salinas
administration.24 Such broad criticism of privatization raised the question of what, if
anything, he would like to be soldo
Cárdenas does not condemn alI privatization, although such subtleties are likely to
get lost in press reporting. He criticizes current privatization efforts as "turning over
the most prüductive state enterprises to multinational firms." He sees such privatization
as resulting from "conditions the foreign creditors have imposed in exchange for debt
negotiation and receiving more loans." Cárdenas c1aims that such decisions should be
left to the Mexican government, not tied to debt settlement.25 Cárdenas also feels
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privatízatíon should be "ratíonal and strengthen specífíc economíc areas and ensure that
new owners have a stake in the well-being of Mexico, and not just engage in
speculation, as has been happening."26
The PRD's advocacy of government economic control has provided conservatives
with ammunition for criticizing the party. For example, Enrique Krauze sees the
party's failure to follow the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (POSE) and recognize the
supremacy of the "invisible hand of the market" over the "visible hand" of the state as
the reason it has failed to build a strong base. Krauze also notes the PRD has failed to
address the question of what is the least expensive way to provide services
traditionally provided by the state.27
The PRD has also been labeled vague or fuzzy on issues. Initially this was
understandable, since the party was new and brought together such diverse ideologies.
Additional factors reinforced this initial impression. It was an easy issue for
unsympathetic media to comment on. The delay in defining the PRD's platform
reinforced this impression. It was only at its November 1990 congress that the basic
documents such as statutes and declaration of principIes were finally agreed upon. To
compound the problem, these documents were published only in 1991. When they
were finally published, the long, detailed documents were not widely read. The
Criticism and Alternative to the Government Economic Policies, for example, had a
press ron of only two thousand.
The vagueness charge put the PRD on the defensive, forcing it not only to say what
it was for, but to declare that it in fact offered a concrete alternative. Referring to the
supposed failure to offer alternatives, a 1990 pamphlet outlining PRD policy stated,
"This pamphlet, the work of the parliamentary group of the PRD, will contribute to
wrecking this pernicious authoritarian allegation." The pamphlet then provided 127
pages of economic analysis.28 In fact PRD proposals are anything but vague. A PRD
study on agriculture devoted sixty-four pages to analyzing current agricultural
problems. This was followed by thírty-five pages of proposed solutíons.29
Another disadvantage the PRD has faced has been generally unsympathetic media
coverage. The PRD has been repeatedly described as a "violent" party due to its
occupation of city halls and blocking of highways to protest election fraud. Despite the
PAN's having initiated highway blocking in the 1980s, its sacking of the furniture
store in Valladolid, Yucatán, and its fatal election-fraud protest in Culiacán, it was
never so labeled.
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The media double standard was apparent in conjunction with Cárdenas's travels to
the United States. On the front page of Excélsior, Romeo Flores Caballero
characterized Cárdenas' s trips to the United States as providing "an invitation for other
nations to declare themselves as guarantors of Mexican democracy." The same issue of
Excélsior reported that PRI President Colosio went to the United States to "improve
Mexico's political image."30 Other publications, while never questioning the motive of
Salinas' s U.S. visits, characterized Cárdenas's trips as "unpatriotic" and
"seditious."31
Sirnilarly, the media uncritically repeated the PRI charge that Cárdenas was illegally
campaigning on election day in Michoacán in July 1989. This was a highly unlikely
charge since he was followed all day by dozens of reporters. Rather than questioning
the charge or consulting with reporters who were with him, the Mexican press widely
repeated the accusation. A Time magazine reporter who was with Cárdenas that day
responded to the PRI's charge on Univisión news, "How can we believe its other
declarations, if we realize that what we have witnessed is a big lie." The
correspondent's comments were not broadcast in Mexico.32 The press also uncritically
repeated charges, made just before the special mayoral election in Uruapan, that
Cárdenas was involved in massive financial fraud. The PRD coordinator responded,
"The government periodically un1eashes media campaigns to denigrate and slander the
PRD, its leaders, and what it represents."33
The PRD has been hurt by alliances between the PRI and other major groups. These
groups feel they need to present a united front with the PRI to blunt the PRD's
momentum. The business community, which before 1988 had been dallying with the
PAN as a safe option to the PRI, has embraced the PRI since the PRD's founding.34
Similarly, the PRD has been hurt by the PAN-PRI alliance. As Bertha Lerner noted,
"There is no doubt [ofl the weakening of Cárdenas' movement and the PRD was one
of the central goals of this alliance."35 Finally, as historian John Coatsworth noted,
after the 1988 presidential elections the U.S. government lost interest in pressuring
Mexico to liberalize its electoral system. Rather than facing the possibility of a PRD
victory, the United States preferred to throw its support to the PRJ,36
Many potential voters feel that the PRD's plans, as they have been elaborated,
simply will not work or will not work as well as Salinas's. The PRD has called for (1)
taxing the rich, (2) substantial wage increases, (3) rethinking (at least) the free trade
agreement, (4) a strong state sector, and (5) regulating foreign investment. Many feel
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that the implementation of such policies would result in massive capital flight. The
experience of President López Mateos (1958-64) is illustrative. When he declared that
Mexico was on the left within the constitution, roughly $200 million left the country,
plunging it into recession. It took some time for him to convince business that he was
not a realleftist and to reestablish business confidence.37
Economist Christopher Whalen commented on what he perceived to be the
inviability of the PRD model, "Recalling past prosperity, Cárdenas promises a return
to 'successful' statist economic policies, without explaining that these polices are the
cause of the country's growing difficulties."38 Columnist Eduardo Borrell Navarro
cornmented on this same problem, "Up until now Cárdenas has not made it clear how
his party, embracing former socialists and Trotskyists, proposes to get owners of
capital to repatriate it, and get them to invest Mexico's resources in a non-inflationary
manner."39 PRO economist lfigenia MartÍnez downplays these concerns, noting that in
fact the largest capital flight in Mexican history occurred during the presidency of De la
Madrid and resulted from a lack of confidence in the economy. She sees PRD policies
as restoring the health of the domestic market, making Mexico safe to invest in, and
thus increasing investment.40
As one might assume, the government has not looked favorably on its rival.
Cárdenas observed: "We are operating in a hostile environment. This makes our
struggle more difficult. The government puts every conceivable obstacle in our
way."41 Comments by PRI officials have reinforced the negative image of the PRD.
Guerrero Governor José Francisco Ruiz Massieu described the PRO as "the party of
blood and violence."42 The PRI has also used ads to undermine the PRD. Just before
the municipal elections in Guerrero, the PRI took out a full-page ad that proclaimed,
"The PRD is for violence in Guerrero."43
Official labor followed the government's lead. CTM (Confederación de
Trabajadores de México) leader Fidel Velázquez declared: "There are many armed
people in Mexico who have plans to destabilize the country. Authorities at the highest
levels know there are opposition members-specifically the PRD-who are involved
with drug traffickers because the weapons they use to occupy city halls cannot come
from anywhere else."44
Other attacks were less obvious. For example a gacetilla, presumably paid for by
the PRI, had headlines proclaiming, "Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the coordinator of the
PRO, makes irresponsible charges of vote fraud."45 In general the government is
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much more critical of the PRD than of the more middle-class PAN, since the PRD is
seen as a threat posed by the lower classes.46
The PRD's response to the Salinas administration has not pro ved fruitful either.
Since Salinas' s inauguration, Cárdenas' s followers have refused to meet with the
president, claiming that he represents an illegitimate government that should not be
dignified by such a meeting. Initially, when Salinas appeared weak, that might have
been a wise tactic. However, as Salinas's political stature has risen and the PRD's has
fallen, the PRD has clung tenaciously to this policy. That has left it open to the charge
that it is intransigent.
Once it became apparent that the PRD would refuse to talk to him, Salinas
repeatedly extended invitations for dialogue. In his 1989 State of the Nation address,
Salinas stated: "1 have invited all the political parties to dialogue. Most of them have
accepted in a serious, responsible manner." This created the image of Salinas as a
reasonable president, and the PRD as obstinate. Rather than using interviews to ask
Salinas embarrassing questions, and then reporting the response (or lack of one) to the
public, Cárdenas has always put conditions on talks, leaving himself isolated. For
example when asked what he would do if Salinas requested direct talks, Cárdenas
replied: "We would have to know why he wanted them and what he wanted to talk
about. We would have to fix an agenda and make the discussion public because we
can 't, as we have said, legitimize what cannot be legitimized with a photo
opportunity. "47
Some potential voters were inevitably alienated by the hard-line stance a faction of
the PRD took vis-á-vis the government. Heberto Castillo reflected such a stance after
the July 1989 elections in Michoacán: "We will make life impossible for the
government. We will call on the public to use its imagination and block government
action in any way it can."48
The hard line vis-á-vis the government has led to criticism both from within and
outside the PRD. Jorge Alcocer, who resigned from the party in protest, noted PRD
policy was based on the "unfounded hope that there would be some sort of collapse of
the government, that Salinas could not govern, and that would be followed by
mobilization and change until new elections were called. But that didn't happen, and
it's not going to happen."49 Alcocer also criticized the PRD for being so obstinately
antigovernment that it failed to join the PRI and the PAN in supporting political
reform. Rather than confrontation, Alcocer felt that the PRD should "force the
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government to pennit a series of changes which would open the way to substantive
change in the political and economic life of the country."50 Similarly, González
Guevara, even after joining the PRD, noted, "Our attacks on the President and the
government have been so exaggerated that they have done the PRD more hann than
good. "51
Another reason for the decline of Cárdenas's coalition is the loss of the opposition
parties that made up the FDN. As columnist Rafael Abascal Macías noted, "Much of
the FDN's ability to mobilize people was supplied by the parties which refused to
disappear. "52 When the alliance dissolved, these parties retained many of their
members. In twenty-one state elections in 1989 and 1990, former FDN members
(inc1uding the COPs) exceeded the PRD's vote in thirteen cases.53 AIso, the parties of
the FDN were never stigmatized as "violent" or "subversive," so it was
psychologically easier to vote for them than it was to vote for the PRD.54 Accelerating
the departure of the former members of the FDN was their inevitable, and often
successful, wooing by the PRI with cash and patronage, the old glue that cemented the
PRI's diverse pre-1988 alliance.55
Another problem faced by Cárdenas backers has been converting a mass following
into a polítical party. In January 1989 Cárdenas commented on this problem, "Our task
is now to build the base committees, to encourage people to discuss problems in them,
and start organizing and mobilizing people. "56 Herberto Castillo made the reason for
this c1ear: "There is an urgent need to institutionalize the PRO. We cannot continue to
follow a single person, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, as we did during the election
campaign. "57
More than ayear after Cárdenas' s initial call for a new party, it was clear that the
party was still poorly organized. It was also clear that one could not blame the press
for misrepresenting the situation, since PRO members themselves were the ones
complaining. Late in 1989 Cárdenas stated, "The work of organizing the party has not
been and is not easy for anyone."58 The PRD paper Seis de Julio was even more
blunt, "The main problem of the PRD is its lack of organization."59
Even after another year had passed, there was still strong internal criticism about the
lack of organization. Cárdenas noted in Oecember 1990 that one of the reasons for the
election loss in the State of Mexico was the lack of organization.60 After joining the
PRD, González Guevara commented on the reason for the decline of the PRD vote
relative to the FON, "The PRD does not have an internal structure."61
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This organizational failure was even more pronounced at the state and locallevel.
The PRD had planned twenty-two state congresses before its November 1990 National
Congress; however, only nine occurred. The PRD ordered six of these to be repeated
due to flaws in the initial congresses. In Morelos the congress was disrupted and a
pistol was drawn in a dispute in which one group charged that another was allied with
a forrner PRI governor who had tried to pack the meeting with PRI 10yalists.62 In
November 1990, Heberto Castillo noted, "In the Federal District our party has
widespread support, but very poor organization."63 In Guerrero the organization was
so spotty that in the 1989 election only an estimated 30 percent of polling places had
PRD poll watchers.64 In fact a PRD report noted that given the low level of grass-
roots organization to fund and support campaigns, candidates were left largely on their
own, convertingnornination into more of a punishment than an honor.65
The single biggest organizational problem of the PRD was the persistence of bloc s
within the party. Even before it was formally organized as a party, an observer
declared, "Factions and subfactions within the tenuous alliance seem to threaten to
withdraw every other day to raise their bargaining power in the group. "66 The Green
Party, one of the 1988 alliance members, did in fact withdraw. The principal internal
split has been between former PRI members, the Democratic Current, and members of
leftist parties such as the PMS. Further complicating the picture, the Mexican left was
not unified before 1988, and the old divisions continued inside the PRD. In fact, a
report on the Executive Committee of the PRD noted it was carefully chosen to
represent the following constituencies: the Democratic Current with seventeen
representatives, the Mexican Socialist Party with six, the Punto Crítico Study Group
with four, the Movement to Socialism with three, and the National Revolutionary
Civic Association with two.67 This delicate balancing act continued even after the first
PRD congress. An Analysis of the political origins of National Council members
selected at the congress showed that twenty-one carne from the Democratic Current,
and the remaining members were divided among the twelve different leftist groups that
had joined the PRD. The number of members from each of the twelve groups was
published.68 It appears that the PRD often adopted a zero-sum mentality, and that
leftist groups focused on gaining representation at the expense of other leftist groups,
without trying to increase the number of new recruits.
Inevitably these splits extended below the national level. In the Chamber of
Deputies, twenty-four of the forty-eight PRD deputies demanded the removal of their
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Chamber leader, former PRI-member Ignacio Castillo Mena. He in turn challenged
those demanding his removal and called the group, led by former PMS member Pablo
Gómez, adventurists. He also noted the door was open for them to leave the party if
they wished.69 In Nayarit both PMS and Democratic Current factions of the PRD held
conventions and sent lists of selected candidates directIy to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas for
his personal approvapo In Baja California Sur there was a definitive rupture, as the
former members of the Democratic Current left the PRD to form the Democratic Party
of Baja California Sur, leaving the state PRD in the hands of former PMS members.71
A variety of other problems impeded the organizational efforts of the party. A lack
of financial resources, especially compared to the government-funded PRI and the
relatively affluent PAN, was constant. Normally, groups of like-minded people meet,
form a party, and then seek a leader to represent them. In the case of the PRD, a
handful of leaders were looking for a base.72 The PRD also suffered from negative
publicity just at the time the movement was creating an image in the public eye and was
being scrutinized to determine its course. La Quina's arrest was handled poorly. After
the arrest, PMS Deputy Gilberto Rincón Gallardo commented, "The authorities used
the criminal charges just so they could repress the oil workers."73 Such declarations
were seized upon by those trying to discredit the party Cárdenas was organizing. For
example, PRI Undersecretary Gándara Magaña wrote, "What a great error those
leaders of the new left made when they tried to repay their campaign debt to La Quina
with their public support for him, a support which is shared by virtually none of the
population."74 Critics ofLa Quina's arrest were confronted with the same delicate task
faced by those criticizing President Bush's invasion of Panama. How do you criticize
without seeming to defend a scoundrel? In the Mexican case some did this better than
others. Elena Poniatowska simply referred to La Quina's replacement as his "moral
twin brother," emphasizing continued corruption in labor. Similarly, Adolfo Gilly
commented that La Quina had been replaced "by an equally corrupt but more docile
leader. "75
Another highly publicized incident involved Cárdenas' s position on the foreign
debt. On December 7, 1988, when he visited the Overseas Development Council in
Washington, Cárdenas commented on the debt question: "New terms have to be
negotiated with the banks. We have never recommended unilateral decisions in the
area."76 Once back in México, on March 18, 1989, Cárdenas stated: "As a first step
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our party proposes immediate suspension of debt payment under the current terms. We
must begin a negotiation which recognizes mutual responsibility."77
Cárdenas's apparent contradictions on the debt question soon led the press to
comment he had one position for U.S. consumption and another for Mexico. The
National Association of Revolutionary Engineers noted that if Cárdenas really opposed
a unilateral debt moratorium, his position was to the right of president of the Business
Coordinating Council (CCE).78
Cárdenas's subsequent efforts to clarify his debt stand only left the picture more
muddled. In 1990 he noted: "At no time has the moratorium been presented as a
unilateral decision by the government of Mexico. It doesn't appear in any documents,
not in those of the Democratic Current, nor in those of the FDN, nor in any speeches
of the FDN candidate, nor in any PRD document."79
Cárdenas was on shaky historical ground when he made such a statement. The
platform of the Democratic Current stated that it advocated "the suspension of debt
service as long as there is no just reduction of its amount, based on national interest,
its market value, and an acknowledgement that lenders share responsibility for the debt
problem."80 Similarly, in a 1988 preelection survey by the paper La Jornada,
Cárdenas responded to the question of how he would deal with the foreign debt:
"Negotiation must be carried out in a radically different way than it is now. To achieve
this, it is necessary to stop the hemorrhaging of resources by suspending debt service
for a time."81
In addition to its strong stand on debt, the biggest asset the FDN took away from
the 1988 elections was its commitment to democracy. A major factor undermining the
PRD has been the tarnishing of this image; critics have seized on the issue. Thus, for
example, economist Luis Pazos noted that despite PRD leaders' profession of
democracy, "None of them participated in it when members of the PRI."82
The first major blow to the PRD's democratic image carne with the nomination of
Martha Maldonado as the PRD's candidate for governor in Baja California. The
nomination was widely described in the press as a "destape." For example, Sergio
Haro and Oscar Hinojosa wrote, "Cárdenas' destape was a copy of a PRI destape.
Salinas announced Margarita Ortega's candidacy in the presidential residence, and
Cárdenas announced Marta Maldonado'sin his residence in Las Lomas."83
Cárdenas was forced to defend the nomination procedure, noting that PRD
members in Baja California had discussed candidates and agreed on Maldonado.
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Cárdenas said she had then called on him to announce the decision.84 Even if that
version was more accurate, it merely shifted decision making to the Mexican
equivalent of a bunch of good old boys in a smoke-filled room. If neither membership
nor the press was even aware the process was going on, it can hardly be called
democratic.
The PRD also failed to create procedures accepted by its own members as
democratic. The primary to select candidates for the July 1989 elections in Michoacán
was widely criticized. Dissidents claimed that PRI-style tactics were used, including
people voting more than once and choosing candidates by dedazo.85 PARM members
charged the primaries were rigged against its members.86 Guadalupe Ortiz Murillo, the
former PRD representative to the Federal Electoral Commission, noted candidate
selection in Michoacán was undemocratic, and, if the PRD was not careful, it would
end up like the PRI.87 Not surprisingly, those outside the party made similar
comments. Columnist Edmundo González Llaca noted the PRD "resorted to forms of
candidate selection that would make a dinosaur blush."88
The 1990 primary to select candidates for the special mayoral election in Uruapan
was al so criticized. The Union of Colonias Populares and the PRD municipal
cornmittee claimed state officials had imposed the PRD mayoral candidate on Uruapan.
They stated: "We are in the PRD because they promise democracy. But if we see that
they are using the old tactics of the government party, we'll just sit out the elections."
The state PRD proceeded to expel fourteen party members from Uruapan who claimed
the procedures were rigged. Regardless of whether the primary was actually rigged,
the issue dragged on for days in the press, damaging the PRD's image.89
The PRD's democratic image was also tarnished by disputes swirling around
Porfirio Muñoz Ledo. The first flap involving Muñoz Ledo began when Cárdenas was
campaigning in Nayarit. He was quoted as saying that Muñoz Ledo should clarify his
actions there in 1975.90 In 1975 Muñoz Ledo was president of the PRI and Alejandro
Gascón Mercado had just been defeated as the PPS candidate for governor in what
many regarded as a stolen election.
A1though Cárdenas later denied he had stated that Muñoz Ledo should clarify his
1975 acts, Pandora's box had been opened.91 Muñoz Ledo tired to put the matter
behind him by saying there were irregularities in the election and that he had
denounced them at the time. The PRI paper El Nacional not only quoted his 1990
statement, but published what Muñoz Ledo had actually said concerning the elections
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in 1975. He had declared them to be "fair and democratic" and had claimed that they
expressed the will of the majority.92 While little was actually clarified about the 1975
election, the matter was discussed on the front page of El Nacional for days and was
widely publicized in other media.
The PRD's democratic image was further undermined by another incident involving
Muñoz Ledo. In the fall of 1990, Muñoz Ledo decided he wanted to be the PRD
candidate for the 1991 gubernatorial election in Guanajuato. There was a significant
obstacle facing Muñoz Ledo: the state constitution of Guanajuato. It stipulated that in
order to be eligible for governor a person had to either be born in the state or have
lived there for five years. Muñoz Ledo quite clearly did not meet either of these
qualifications. Not only had he been born in Mexico City, but at the time he decided to
launch his candidacy, he was serving as PRD senator for the Federal District.
Muñoz Ledo declared himself to be eligible by virtue of "blood right," based on his
family's having settled in Guanajuato in the late 1600s. Only in recent times had his
family moved to Mexico City. Not surprisingly, this set off a strong media reaction. A
headline in El Universal announced, "Muñoz Ledo acts unconstitutionally in
Guanajuato."93 Columnist Federico Arreola commented, "Muñoz Ledo is aman who
knows a lot of dirty tricks, which he learned in the PRI, and aman of little morality,
which he showed in Guanajuato."94
Muñoz Ledo's aspiring to the gubernatorial nomination also provided the opposition
fertile ground for criticismo Vicente Fox, who was nominated in October 1990 as the
PAN candidate for governor of Guanajuato, noted: "It is understandable that a person
like Muñoz Ledo, due to his egocentrism, would want to be a candidate. However
when a political institution like the PRD defrauds both its members and the citizens at
large, it appears to me to be irresponsible. "95
Samuel del Villar, the PRD legal adviser, declared that Muñoz Ledo was not eligible
to be governor since Mexico does not recognize blood rights. Rather than accepting the
opinion of his own party's legal adviser, Muñoz Ledo dismissed del Villar's opinions
as "suspicious," and stated that he should stop "interfering with the internal affairs of
Guanajuato."96 This was a strange charge coming from someone who not only was
living in Mexico City, but was serving as a Federal District senator. All in all the
matter reflected poorly on the PRD since, with few exceptions, such as del Villar, the
entire party structure supported Muñoz Ledo's candidacy.
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The carpetbagger phenomenon has also tainted the party's image. The case of
Muñoz Ledo has already been mentioned. Similarly, in 1992, Heberto Castillo was the
PRD candidate for governor of Veracruz. There was no question of the legality of
Castillo' s candidacy-he was born in Ixhuatlán de Madero, Veracruz, in 1928.
However, Castillo's parents moved to Mexico City when he was stilI in grade
school. 97 Thus, his return to Veracruz as a candidate half a century later cast the PRD
more in the role of employment agency for idle politicians than a force for democracy.
The PRD's being centered around one person, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, also created
problems. Cárdenas was aware of this, noting: "1 realize that much of the campaign
response is still centered around one person, around me. It isn't easy to translate an
electoral response into a consistent party organization."98 Two years after the call for
its founding, a columnist remarked, "The PRD continues to be the patrimony of a
single man."99 The difficulty of transforming the folIowing of an individual into a
formal party was indicated by a polI conducted before the elections in the State of
Mexico. Only 29 percent of the respondents could identify the party that represented
Cárdenas. 100
Ayear after Cárdenas' s calI for the founding of a party, a PRD internal document
noted: "Only with Cárdenas is it possible lO have important public gatherings. A party
such as the one we wish to construct cannot and should not rely only on the popularity
of one of its leaders."101 This domination of the party both formalIy and informally
became the subject of criticismo After resigning from the PRD, Jorge Alcocer
observed: "It's not a secret that the main decisions are taken outside the party
headquarters. What is important are these informal decisions, not the debates and
meetings of the formal party organs."102 Alcocer also criticized Cárdenas' s role in the
party: "Cárdenas's leadership has become a negative factor. 1 feel it is retarding the
development of the PRD and that it inhibits, in various ways, the participation of many
capable party leaders who are important in their own right."103
Rather than pressing the issue of decentralizing power, the party simply wrote rules
that concentrated it. The party's statutes (Art. 42, Seco VII) provided that the party's
president name all members of the National Executive Council. The National Council
would then approve or reject them as a bloc. The party's president, of course, was
Cárdenas. Heberto Castillo criticized this: "1 continue to feel that it is undemocratic to
give one member of the leadership, regardless of what his surname is, the power to
choose members of the Party's National Executive Council."l04
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Cárdenas's dominant role in the party has not only produced complaints, but is
closely associated with the PRD's reduced vote percentage. Since his name has not
appeared on a ballot since 1988, the PRD has failed to attract voters whose principal
loyalty is to Cárdenas. Some of those who voted him for in 1988 felt nostalgia for his
father, but have yet to identify with the PRD.
The PRD was also hurt by the difficulty of extending its vision to the locallevel.
The responsibilities of local officials, filling potholes and treating sewage, do not
easily lend themselves to differing ideologies. This has made it difficult to appeal to
voters as a PRD candidate. It was also difficult to come up with a catchy sound bite
like "suspend debt payments" (if indeed Cárdenas's movement stood for that) to
describe local programs.
An example of this difficulty can be found in the campaign material of Patricia
Flores Carlos, the PRD' s 1991 can didate for state legislature from District 13 in
Monterrey, Nuevo León. Her campaign pamphlet stated:
Democracy is creating and promoting laws which respond to the interests of the
residents of this district concerning matters such as traffic, ecology, marginal
areas, social development, urban development, education, and preserving
neighborhoods as the nucleus of family development.
It is hard to disagree with such goals; however, all of them could just as easily have
been promised by a PRIor a PAN candidate.
The same problem of designing a distinctly PRD local program became apparent in
Morelia. In his inaugural address, Mayor Maldonado listed some twenty-one problem
areas he would address, including environmental problems, better bus service, parks,
jobs, street vendors, and garbage collection.105 While all were laudable goals, none
reflected a PRD approach, as opposed to just generic good municipal administration.
When specifically asked how, other than being efficient and honest, he would
incorporate PRD ideology into municipal administration, Maldonado responded by
saying he would "respect the Constitution and laws."106 Again, this is laudable but
does not differentiate the PRD from other parties.
The party has often been criticized for being too standoffish, likely a product of its
initial belief that it could attain power alone. It has criticized popular movements for
taking badly needed Solidarity money, thus isolating itself from them.107 The PRD
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founded its own group, the Democratic Peasant Union, which cut it off from other
peasant groups.108 Similarly it failed to accept an alliance with the CDPs as equals.109
Finally it failed to back Rulfo in Baja California when it could have. This would have
left the PRD with a share of the glory rather than the legacy of a mediocre
campaign.11O
The PRD's problems were highlighted by the December 26, 1990, resignation of
Jorge Alcocer from the PRD. Alcocer had a long (for a thirty-five-year old) career in
the Left, having joined the Mexican Communist Party in 1978, and then having stayed
with it through its mergers to form the PSUM and then the PMS. He was a PRD
leader who served as the PRD's representative to the Federal Electoral Commission.
At the time of his resignation, Alcocer voiced a wide range range of criticisms of the
PRD. He charged that the National Executive Committee of the PRD was dominated
by former members of the PRI, to the exclusion of socialists, specifically former
members of PSUM. He also criticized the party for being too centralized. Other of his
criticisms were quoted above. Most of his views had been aired before, but they were
particularly damaging, due not only to his stature within the party, but to the
widespread publicity they received.
Despite having fallen behind what they had initially hoped to achieve, PRD
organizers have by no means given up. As of 1992, the PRD effort might be compared
to that of Polish Solidarity in 1985. The common feature of both movements is having
lost ground. The hope for the PRD is ultimately what saved the Polish movement from
obscurity, the incumbents' inability to manage the economy. PRD hopes are largely
based on Salinas's early economic promise fading. This is not an unlikely event given
the near collapse of the economy at the end of the terms of Salinas's three immediate
predecessors and the faltering of the Mexican stock market in mid-1992. The other
crucial ingredient to a 1994 PRD success-Ít was hoped-would be the presence,
once again, of Cárdenas' s name on the ballot.
Appendix
Comparison of 1988-1991 State Electoral Results (Percentages)
Tabasco (Nov. 1988) 19.9 20.Sa
Jalisco (Dec. 1988) 23.9 10.1b
Zacatecas (Dec. 1988) 22.3 0.7c
Baja California (Ju1y 1989) 37.2 2.8
Campeche (Ju1y 1989) 16.3 2.0
Chihuahua (Ju1y 1989) 6.8 1.2
Durango (Ju1y 1989) 18.8 3.2
Michoacán (July 1989) 64.2 40.3
Zacatecas (July 1989) 22.3 5.6
Oaxaca (Aug. 1989) 30.3 6.7
Veracruz (Sept. 1989) 31.1 6.0
Aguasca1ientes (Oct. 1989) 18.7 1.8
Sinaloa (Gct. 1989) 16.8 4.2
Puebla (Nov. 1989) 17.7 6.3
Tamaulipas (Nov. 1989) 30.2 9.0
Tlaxcala (Nov. 1989) 31.0 7.5
Guerrero (Dec. 1(89) 35.8 24.3
Michoacán (Dec. 1989) 64.2 42.3d
Hidalgo (Jan. 1990) 28.3 5.6
Quintana Roo (March 1990) 24.1 9.4
Nayarit (June 1990) 36.8 10.3
Baja California Sur (Ju1y 1990) 25.9 2.8
San Luis Potosí (Aug. 1990) 8.8 1.6
Estado de México (Nov. 1990) 51.6 14.5
Yucatán (Nov. 1990) 1.6 1.9
Morelos (March 1991) 57.7 20.7
Note: Vote percentages for the 1988 federal election are from El Cotidiano, Sept.-Dec. 1988, p. 16.
Unless otherwise indicated, vote percentages for state elcctions are from Medina (1991: 18).
<l(Jómcz Tagle & Holtz 1989: 25 (percentage is for FDN gubematorial candidate).
bLa Jornada, Dcc. 13, 1988, p. 7 (percentage is for Cardenista Coalition of Jalisco).
cLa JJrnada, Dcc. 13, 1988, p. 13 (percentage is for PARM).
dMotlvos, March 23, 1992, p. 23.
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